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2I. INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has transformed itself in response to the growth
of managed care, which developed as a method to contain the costs of health
care.' Under the traditional fee-for-service system of practicing medicine, doc-
tors practiced medicine without incentives to reduce the costs imposed on pa-
tients, their insurers, and the health care system. Most doctors practiced inde-
pendently and were reimbursed for each service rendered by passive insurance
companies. Shielded from the oversight of third-party intermediaries, doctors
had nancial incentives to provide more services, regardless of whether those
services were therapeutically necessary. In this context, pharmaceutical com-
panies directed their marketing eorts toward individual physicians, who had
complete discretion as to what drugs to prescribe. Under the fee-for-service
system, doctors and the drug industry prospered, but the cost of health care
skyrocketed, leading to calls for change.
1 For a concise description of managed care, see Jonathan P. Weiner &
Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care
and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y AND L. 75, 97 (1993).
The authors dene managed care as follows:
A term often used generically for all types of integrated delivery systems,
such as HMOs [Health Maintenance Organizations] and PPOs liPreferred Provider
Organizations], implying that they manage the care received by consumers (in
contrast to traditional fee-for-service care, which is unmanaged). More recently,
this term is often used to denote the entire range of utilization control tools
that are applied to manage the practices of physicians and others, regardless
of the setting in which they practice. In addition to being used in all HMOs,
PPOs, and EPOs [Exclusive Provider Organizations], these controls are increas-
ingly being applied to conventional fee-for-service indemnity plans. The types of
methods used to manage the patient's care may include preadniission certica-
tion, mandatory second opinion before surgery, certication of treatment plans
for discretional nonemergency services (such as mental health care), primary
care physician gatekeepers and nonphysician case managers to monitor the care
of particular patients.
1
3In the mid- 1970s, managed care arose as one solution to control the rising costs
of health care.2 Since then, managed care organizations have come to replace
individual physicians, fee-for-service reimbursement, and independent hospitals.
In a managed care system, individual physicians do not have complete discretion
to prescribe whatever medication they deem appropriate. Physicians are con-
strained, to various degrees, to prescribe only medications listed on a formulary,
a list of preferred drugs. By getting their products listed on a formulary, drug
companies can reach large patient populations and realize substantial prots.
The pharmaceutical industry has restructured itself to keep pace with the
revolutionary changes in the health care system. Drug manufacturers have
formed alliances with pharmacy benets managers (PBMs), which exert con-
siderable inuence over what drugs physicians prescribe. The legal implications
of these alliances are still unclear. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
raised concerns about the anticompetitive eects of industry consolidation. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has reconsidered its traditional analysis
of pharmaceutical communications in light of these changes. The Oce of the
Inspector General (OIG) at the Department of Health and Human Services has
investigated practices that may violate the federal antikickback statute. How its
mission will be aected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 has yet to be determined. As the pharmaceutical industry continues
to adapt to the new world of managed care, the government agencies that
2See generally, Thomas R Mayer & Gloria Gilbert Mayer, HMOs: Origins
and
Development, 312 NEw ENG. J. MiD., 590-94 (1985), Alain C. Enthoven,
The History and
Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 24-48 (1993), Troyen
A. Brennan &
D.M. Berwick, NEW RULEs: REGULATION, MARKETS AND THE QUAL-
ITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE, 149-174 (1995). The managed care revolution is largely attributable
to the HMO Act of
1973, which was passed by the Nixon administration as a part of health care
reform.
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4regulate the industry are adapting as well.
II. THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION
A. A Shfft in the Balance of Power: From Physicians to PBMs
Under the traditional fee-for-service system, drug companies marketed their
products directly to individual physicians. Companies would send out salespeo-
ple (known as detailers) who provided drug samples and information to physi-
cians in an eort to encourage their use of the company's products.3 Doctors
made prescribing decisions based on their knowledge of the therapeutic value of
a drug, not cost considerations.4
Today, the majority of privately insured people in this country are enrolled
in managed care plans.5 Seventy ve percent of all doctors practice under man-
aged care controls, such as oversight and capitated fees, for at least some of
their patients.6 Under a managed care system, decisions about which drugs
to prescribe are often made by a committee or a Pharmacy Benets Manager
(PBM), rather than an individual doctor.7 Committees and PBMs are meant
to supplant
~ See generally, Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the
FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representa-
tives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309 (1992); Andrew S. Krulwich, The Response
to Health Care Reform by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
1 (1995) [hereinafter Health Care Reform].
~ In some cases, prescription decisions are inuenced by gifts such as meals,
trips, and cash payments provided by drug companies. See infra Part lV.
~ Thomas A. Hayes, Drug Labeling and Promotion: Evolution and Applica-
tion of Regulatory Policy, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 57 [hereinafter Drug Labeling].
61d
Ron Winslow, Buyer's Market: Prescribing Decisions Increasingly Are Made
By the Cost-Conscious; Doctors Are Pressured to Bow to Votes of Committees
and Their Formularies,
3
5drug company detailers and provide doctors with advice on which medications
are the most cost-eective.8
PBMs are companies that provide a variety of pharmaceutical services to em-
ployer group health plans and managed care entities such as HMOs and PPOs.9
As part of an overall eort to control costs, managed care organizations pur-
chase pharmaceuticals through PBMs, which have the expertise and the market
power to obtain discounts from pharmaceutical companies.10 PBMs negotiate
discounts from drug companies by agreeing to list the company's products on
the PBIvVs formulary, which ensures that the products will be prescribed in
volume.
PBMs and managed care organizations exert varying degrees of control to
encourage doctors to prescribe drugs listed on a formulary. Under some plans,
doctors are merely given incentives to prescribe the preferred drugs; under other
plans, they are required to prescribe from the formulary. PBMs may encourage
use of their preferred drugs by paying pharmacists a fee when they convince
doctors to switch to formulary drugs, or by requiring higher co-payments for
drugs that are not on the formulary. The incentives that managed care or-
ganizations use may include providing the formulary to physicians, tracking
prescribing behavior, and notifying and
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1992 at Al [hereinafter Buyer's Market].
8k1
~ Bruce N. Kuhuik, The FDA '~s~ Regulation of Pharmaceutical Commu-
nications in the Context of Managed Care: A Suggested Approach, 50 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 23, 31-32 (1995) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Communications].
PBMs are not the only organizations that manage pharmaceuticals; HMOs and
insurers operating PPOs may perform this function on in-house basis. Id
10 See Health Care Reform, supra note 3, at 2.
~ Id
4
6counterdetailing non-complying physicians.'2 Although formularies narrow the
range of doctors' choices, ~aged care strategists argue that dierences between
drugs in the same class are negligible.'3
PBMs operate in dierent ways and can serve a variety of functions.'4 Some
dispense prescription drugs through mail orders or their own facilities. PBMs
may also perform drug utilization review (DUR), which involves monitoring
prescribing patterns to promote appropriate and cost-eective use of drugs.
DUE. may include the electronic review of prescription records and review of
patient medical records. A related service is outcomes research, which assesses
the outcomes of particular drug treatments. PBMs may then sell this informa-
tion to drug companies. Another function PBMs serve is conducting disease
management programs (DMIPs), which involve the development of protocols
for treating certain diseases. The programs target diseases that can be treated
with long-term drug therapy, which may reduce the need for surgery and other
medical treatments. Finally, PBMs and pharmaceutical companies are increas-
ingly assuming nancial risk under capitation or risk-sharing arrangements. The
PBM or drug company agrees to provide an unlimited amount of certain pre-
scription drugs in exchange for a xed fee, which puts them at risk of losing
money if plan participants require more medication than anticipated.
12 Pharmaceutical Communications, supra note 9, at 30.
'~ Buyer's Market, supra note 7.
For a general description of PBMs, see Kevin J. Dunne & Ciara R Ryan,
How Management of Medical Costs Is Revolutionizing the Drug Industry, 62
DEF. CouNs. J. 177, 178-79 (1995).
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7Drug companies have recognized and responded to the proliferation of managed
care and PBMs. As a result of these systemic changes, drug companies market
their drugs to individual physicians far less than they did in the past. Formu-
laries represent a large market share, whereas individual physicians generally
do not. The focus of marketing activities has thus shifted from the individual
physician to PBMs and managed care organizations, including LIMOs, insur-
ance companies, hospitals, large corporations, and others.15 These institutional
customers provide drug companies access to millions of patients, but their clout
also enables them to wrest sizable discounts.
As the discretion of doctors has diminished under managed care, so has
the role of the drug detailers. Detailers, once the driving sales force behind
the pharmaceutical industry, no longer have unrestrained access to physicians.
For example, at Kaiser Permanente, a powerful managed care network, drug
detailers are subject to thirty two rules, all of which were designed to block overly
aggressive marketing.'6 Detailers are forbidden from promoting any medicine
that isn't on the Kaiser formulary and they cannot visit a Kaiser facility without
an appointment.'7 In response to changes such as these, drug companies have
scaled back their detail forces.
In spite of the growing prevalence of managed care controls, pharmaceutical
companies still nd ways to inuence physicians. A recent study found that
traditional marketing directed at physicians continues to be eective in the
managed care market.'8 The study found that
~ Health Care Reform, supra note 3, at 1.
16 George Anders, Rxfor Sales: Managed Health Care Jeopardizes Outlook
For Drug 'Detailers'; Pharmaceutical Marketing Demands New Strategies; Costs
Over Camaraderie, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Rxfor Sales].
171d
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8physicians who requested hospital approval for drugs to be placed on a formu-
lary were much more likely than other physicians to have accepted funds from
pharmaceutical companies to pay for travel, speaking, or research expenses.19
Whether the physicians recommended certain drugs based on their merits
or based on remuneration is unclear. Given that drug detailers are known to
make inated sales pitches rather than objective assessments,20 the results of
the study are troubling. It is true managed care has diminished the impact
of detailers, but drug companies and, for better or worse, doctors, still rely on
them. In light of this study, Kaiser's policy of minimizing physician relationships
with pharmaceutical companies seems vindicated. Kaiser's remedy for curbing
industry's inuence on physicians is to restrain the detailers and to provide an
independent assessment of drugs. Savvy drug manufacturers, however, have
found innovative ways to meet the challenges presented by managed care.
B. Managed Care Leads to Prot for Drug Makers
The growth of managed care has resulted in strong growth for pharmaceuti-
cal companies, despite predictions to the contrary in the early days of managed
care.2' Managed care
18 Mary-Margaret Chren and C. Seth Landefeld, Physicians'Behavior and
Their Interactions With Drug Companies: A Controlled Study of Physicians
Who Requested Additions to a Hospital Drug Formulary, 271 Ji,aMA 684-89
(1994).
'91d
20 The accuracy of statements made by detailers is often brought into ques-
tion. See, e.g., Ron Winslow, Drug-Industry Sales Pitches to Doctors Are In-
accurate 11% of Time, Study Says, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1995, at B6; Rrfor
Sales, supra note 16.
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9organizations, which demanded large discounts in return for putting a drug
company's product on a formulary, were initially viewed as a threat to the phar-
maceutical industry. Drug companies, however, have learned how to work with
managed care customers and have scaled back discounting for health plans that
cannot secure their preferred status or for plans that are too small.22 Growing
drug prots are also attributed to the greater use of phamaceuticals by managed
care organizations, which are increasingly using drug therapy to help patients
avoid surgery and other more costly treatments.23 LIMOs have also enrolled
patients, including many Medicare patients, who previously did not have cov-
erage for prescription drugs. In an LIMO, prescriptions are usually reimbursed,
prompting more people to ll their prescriptions for larger amounts of pills. As
managed care organizations, however, enroll greater numbers of Medicare pa-
tients and their drug bills rise, they will have a greater incentive to rein in their
drug spending.
One way to penetrate the managed care market is to join it. Many pharma-
ceutical companies have purchased or formed alliances with PBMs so that they
will have the ability to inuence directly physicians' prescribing decisions, thus
increasing their market share. Within the space of a year, three major drug
companies purchased three of the leading PBMs. In July 1993, Merck & Co.,
the world's largest drug company, purchased Medco Containment Services Inc.,
21 Elyse Tanouye, Five Drug Makers Post Healthy Prots, As Managed Care
Spurs Prescriptions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1996, at A2.
22 Elyse Tanouye, Big Drug Makers Regaining Control Over Their Prices;
Companies Reduce Discounting, Learn to Deal With Managed Care, WALL ST.
J., July 12, 1995, at B4.
23 Elyse Tanouye, Managed Care Is Boosting Drug Sales; Surprising Trend
Helps Push Prot Higher at Merck, J&.J, and Schering-Plough, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 17, 1996, at BlO.
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10one of the nation's largest PBMs, for $6.6 billion.24 In May 1994, SmithKline
Beecham PLC bought United HealthCare Corp.'s Diversied Pharmaceutical
Services Inc. for $2.3 billion.25 In July 1994, Eli Lilly & Co. bought McKesson
Corp.'s PCS health systems for $4 billion.26 The new alliances within the drug
industry have led to prots, but also to controversy.
Sales rose at Merck & Co., SmithKline Beecham PLC, and El Lilly & Co.,
the three companies that purchased PBMs in 1993 and 1994, but sales have also
risen at drug companies that didn't buy PBMs.27 Drug companies who bought
PBMs did so hoping to gain a large share of the managed care market, which
was then seen as a threat to drug sales. Managed care, however, proved to
promote drug sales rather than hinder them, leading to increased prots for the
drug industry as a whole.
C. New Alliances Cause Controversy
1. Therapeutic Substitutions
PBMs carry a full line of pharmaceuticals, including those made by compet-
ing drug companies, but after an acquisition by a manufacturer, a PBM is more
likely to sell a greater share
24 Michael Waldholz & George Anders, Merck To Purchase Medco in $6
Billion Transaction, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1993, at A3.
25 Ron Winslow & Stephen D. Moore, SmithKline Sets To Purchase Benets
Firm, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1994, at A3.
26 Thomas M. Burton & Elyse Tanouye, Eli Lilly to Buy McKesson Unit for
$4 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1994, at A3.
27 Elyse Tanouye, Value of Some Drug Firms'Acquisitions Is Questioned;
Owning a Pharmacy Benet Manager May Not Make Much Dierence, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 19, 1996 at B4.
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11of its parent's drugs.28 Merck, for example, used controversial sales tactics in-
volving Medco, its PBM.29 After its acquisition of Medco, Merck still employed
detailers to visit physicians and to leave samples, but it also used Medco's phar-
macists to sell Merck's products. Although most states permit generic substitu-
tions, pharmacists are generally prohibited form making therapeutic substitu-
tions of chemically dierent drugs without the authorization of the prescribing
physician.30
Pharmacists employed by Medco would call physicians to try to persuade
them to switch prescriptions to dierent, Medco-preferred drugs.3' When Medco
was independent, it used telemarketing tactics to encourage physicians to pre-
scribe lower-cost brand name or generic drugs. After Medco was purchased by
Merck, Medco pharmacists used those same techniques to sell Merck's drugs.
Medco's telemarketing pharmacists were able to switch 75,000 prescriptions a
month, or nearly 1 million a year.32 Medco could not deny that the telephone
switches improved its market share, but it defended the practice as a cost-
containment measure.33
28 See David Woodward, The New Drug Marketing: A Consumer Protection
Perspective,
51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 637, 64 1-43 [hereinafter New Drug Marketing]
29Elyse Tanouye, Changing Minds: Owning Medco, Merck Takes Drug Mar-
keting The Next Logical Step; Pharmacists Cajole Doctors To Switch Prescrip-
tions, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Changing Minds]
30 See Pharmaceutical Communications, supra note 9, at 29.
31 Changing Minds, supra note 29.
32 Id.
Id
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12activities.34 Under the settlement, Medco pharmacists must disclose that they
are calling on behalf of Medco, and that Medco is owned by Merck.35 Medco
may not make unsubstantiated claims that changing a prescription will save
money for consumers participating in health plans managed by Medco.36 Even
before the settlement was reached, Medco had akeady taken steps to reform its
practices, such as explaining its services to physicians and disclosing that they
are owned by Merck. ~'
The settlement may have led to modications at Merck and Medco, but
it did not end the practice of therapeutic substitution.38 The FDA recently
expressed concern about the potentially harmful consequences of the practice.
On March 3, 1997, the agency's Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising &
Communications (DDMAC) issued a statement requesting reports of any ad-
verse consequences of therapeutic switches.39 The FDA issued the statement
after becoming aware that health care professionals and patients have expressed
concern about health
~' In the Matter of Merck & Co., Inc. and Medco Containment Services,
Inc., No. C6-95-106 14 (Minn. Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct. Oct. 25, 1995) (as-
surance of discontinuance and order approving assurance of discontinuance).
This agreement was the sixth of seven multistate settlements coordinated by
the Minnesota Attorney General's Consumer Enforcement Division. The settle-
ments involved the application of state consumer laws to various promotional
activities in the pharmaceutical industry. See New Drug Marketing, supra note
28.
'~ New Drug Marketing, supra note 28, at 644.
36Id
371d at 645.
38 See Milt Freudenheim, Not Quite What the Doctor Ordered; Drug Sub-
stitutions Add to Discord Over Managed Care, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 8, 1996, at
Dl.
~ Therapeutic Switches Resulting in Adverse Events: Reports Requested By
FDA, F-D-C REP. (THE GREEN SHEET), Mar. 10, 1997, at 2.
11
13becoming aware that health care professionals and patients have expressed con-
cern about health care programs that use limited formularies and manage phar-
maceutical care by substituting a dierent member of a pharmacologic class,
or a drug of a wholly dierent pharmacologic class, for the prescribed drug.40
After the FDA receives more information regarding switching practices, it will
decide whether they present a public health concern.
2. Promotional Activities
In light of the changes that have taken place under managed care, the FDA
has also reconsidered its traditional analysis of pharmaceutical communications.4'
The FDA has expressed particular concern with respect to cost-eectiveness
claims and the consequences of alliances between manufacturers and PBMs.42
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),43 the FDA has
responsibility for regulating the labeling and advertising of prescription drugs.
The agency reviews promotional materials disseminated by, or on behalf of?
pharmaceutical manufacturers to ensure that such materials are accurate, con-
tain proper disclosures, are in fair balance in terms of risk and benet informa-
tion, and are consistent with approved drug labeling.
401d
~ See Pharmaceutical Marketing and Information Exchange in Managed Care
Environments; Public Hearing and Request for Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,891
(Aug. 14, 1995).
42Id
'Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), codied as amended at 21 U.S.C.
xx 301 et seq. (1988).
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14The FDA recognizes that pharmaceutical marketing has changed to emphasize
value in addition to safety and eectiveness claims. In the past, doctors were
the main customers of drug manufacturers, but under a managed care system,
the customer is often an institutional decisionmaker. To achieve their cost-
containment objectives, managed care and institutional decisionmakers need
information about comparative costs. Since data on cost-eectiveness usually
involves comparisons of the uses and benets of drugs, the FDA regards such
data as labeling that accompanies the drug. Whether the FDA can, or should,
subject cost-eectiveness claims to stringent labeling requirements has been a
matter of wide debate.45
Another question the FDA must grapple with is how the alliances between
PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers have changed promotional activities.
Since PBMs disseminate information to formulary decisionniakers, physicians,
and patients about the manufacturer's product, the issue is whether a PBMs'
drug-related statements are made on behalf of the parent drug manufacturer.
If so, the statements would fall under the FDA's authority to regulate labeling
and advertising. A related question is whether a PBM that has an o-label
use on its formulary violates the law or whether a manufacture who sells to the
PBM also violates the law. 46
'Drug Labeling, supra note 5, at 63..
'See, e.g., Stephen Paul Mahinka and Kathleen M. Sanzo, Pharmaceutical
Industry
Restructuring and New Marketing Approaches: Enforcement Responses, 50
FOOD & DRUG L.J.
313, 319-22 (1995) [hereinafter Enforcement Responses]; Drug Labeling, supra
note 5, at 62-65.
For suggestions as to how the FDA should modify its approach to the regu-
lation of
pharmaceutical communications, see Pharmaceutical Communications, supra
note 9.
46 See Health Care Reform, supra note 3, at 19.
13
153. Other Concerns
The alliances within the pharmaceutical industry have also led to a multitude
of controversies. Privacy concerns are raised when PBMs, which have access to
information about individual prescriptions, share that information with drug
manufacturers. Manufacturers can use this information to inuence drug se-
lection and use, and to make cost-eectiveness claims. As the alliances among
PBMs, drug manufacturers, and managed care organizations continue to evolve,
new controversies can be expected to arise. For example, PBMs and drug com-
panies are involved in disease management programs, particularly those that
require heavy use of prescription drugs. These programs can lead to legal con-
icts involving antitrust claims, state restrictions on the corporate practice of
medicine, and the federal antikickback statute.47 Despite these legal hurdles,
there are no signs that the pharmaceutical industry's interest managed care is
waning.48
D. The Paradox of Managed Care: Patients v. Prots
As technological breakthroughs in drug therapies promise improved treat-
ment of diseases such as heart disease and depression, drug makers, doctors, and
the managed care industry are struggling to nd acceptable cost-benet trade-
os. Expensive new drug therapies may provide hope for patients and prots
for drug companies, but squeeze the resources of managed care
~ See Mark Learn, Applying Medicare and Medicaid Antikickback Laws to
Disease Management Programs: RamWcations for the Pharmaceutical Industry
and a Regulatory Proposal, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 245, 246-48 (1996) [hereinafter
Disease Management Programs]
'See Elyse Tanouye & Greg Steinmetz, Managed-Care Feeding Frenzy Proba-
bly Hasn't Ended; Drug Firms' Targets May Shift From Benets-Plan Managers
to HMOs, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1994, at B3.
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16organizations, such as LIMOs, which heavily promote cost-containment. This
dilemma is illustrated by a class of cholesterol-lowering drugs called statins,
which have proven to be among the most eective therapies to help prevent
heart attacks and heart disease.49 The drugs, however, cost patients and their
health plans over $700 a year, leading to questions as to whether they should
be prescribed to low-risk patients.
Managed care organizations attempt to save money by investing in relatively
inexpensive prevention measures and avoiding expensive surgery and hospital
stays. Statins appear to illill the goal of prevention, which could benet the
thirteen million people who have heart disease, the leading cause of death in the
nation and its most expensive health problem.50 Despite the proven benets of
statins, a survey found that only 25% of eligible people were on statins, whether
they were in an LIMO or not.5' More HMO's are approving the use of statins,
but not without reservations as to its cost. One LIMO estimated that the cost
of statins will initially exceed the avoided expense of hospital procedures, but
that the LIMO would recover its investment by the sixth year. 52
Some critics believe that many LIMOs will develop their guidelines on the
prescription of statins based on short-term economic pressures, not long-term
benets to patients. Since HMOs are under pressure to meet quarterly nancial
targets, and since annual member turnover rate is
Ron Winslow, Pricey Prescription: Powerful Medications For Cholesterol
Pose A Paradox for HMOs; Curbing the Future Expense of Heart Disease Raises
Concerns on Present Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1996, at Al.
501d
~' Id
52 Id
15
17typically more than 15%, HMOs may decide not to invest in such an expensive
treatment only to have patients leave before the economic benets are realized.53
Drug companies that produce statins are devising ways to overcome the
HMOs' reservations. Merck & Co. and Bristol-Myers, the two leading statin
makers, have bypassed doctors and LIMOs and launched a successful marketing
campaign to appeal directly to consumers.54 HMO members who might benet
from statins, and even those who might not, may pressure their doctors to
prescribe statins once they become aware of the new drug. lIMOs may resist
consumer pressure to prescribe statins, especially when those consumers are
not at high risk for heart disease. They cannot, however, ignore the growing
problem of heart disease among an aging population.
Like heart disease, the treatment of depression and other mental illnesses also
illustrates the tension between prots and patient welfare. Managed care orga-
nizations prefer to treat mental health problems with drugs, which is cheaper
than psychotherapy.55 Many managed care plans limit coverage for psychother-
apy and pay psychiatrists more to supervise drug treatment than to provide
counseling.56 Drug therapy may oer benets to patients, but many psychia-
trists feel more eective results are achieved through a combination of drugs
and traditional psychotherapy.57 In some cases, drugs alone are oered, or with
a limited number of therapy
~ Id
541d
~ Ellen Joan Pollock, The New Economics of Mental Health; Side Eects:
Managed Care's Focus On Psychiatric Drugs Alarms Many Doctors; They Say
Eort to Cut Costs Leads to Overuse, Misuse Of Pills for Mental Illness, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 1, 1995, at Al.
56 Id
16
18sessions. In other cases, older drugs with unpleasant side eects are prescribed
instead of the newer, but more expensive, drugs such as Prozac, Zoloft and
Paxil.58
When doctors or their patients request a combination of psychotherapy with
drugs, or the newer drugs, they are often overruled by the managed care orga-
nizations and LIMOs that determine whether the treatment will be covered by
insurance.59 Some managed care plans maintain a hierarchy of preferred treat-
ments for mental illnesses, with older, less expensive drugs being the rst choice,
newer drugs the second choice, and psychotherapy, the most expensive option,
the last choice.60 Other plans put deterrents in place, such as requiring doctors
to get prior authorization from a senior clinician before prescribing an expensive
drug.6'
Managed care organizations cut costs by using drugs to treat mental illnesses,
but whether these cuts lead to long-term savings is an open question. One study
found that total health care expenses are higher when depression is treated
with the older tricycic drugs than when Prozac is used.62 The study found that
patients treated with older anti-depressants required more doctor~s visits, lab
tests and hospitalizations.63
~ Id 581d
59Id
60Id
61 Id
62Id
63 Id Because the study was funded by Eli Lilly & Co., the maker of Prozac,
some questioned the validity of the ndings. Id
17
19Calculating the costs of treatment for mental illness is not always easy, since
symptoms may not appear in the form of physical ailments that can be treated.
Moreover, evaluating the success of treatment for mental illness is not as easily
accomplished as evaluating the success rate for physical Thesses and diseases.
With drug therapy, patients may experience short-term success, only to nd
that drugs do not provide a lasting solution. Since patients frequently switch
managed care plans, managed care organizations may not have a sucient eco-
nomic incentive to ensure that patients receive the best long-term therapy.
Managed care systems are faced with the dilemma of how to make a prot
while ensuring the health ofpatients6 Doctors are caught in the middle as they
try to be responsive to the patients they serve as well as to the managed care or-
ganizations that employ them. Drug companies, meanwhile, promote expensive
treatments that might save lives, but at a cost that may put such treatments out
of the reach of those who do not have generous insurance coverage. These di-
cult issues will only become more complicated as drug companies develop new
technologies and new alliances in a health care system increasingly dominated
by managed care.
In. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
A. FTC Challenges Vertical Integration in Pharmaceutical Markets
The mergers and alliances between pharmaceutical companies and PBMs
have raised antitrust concerns. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has kept
track of changing
64 A recent study of cost-containment practices at LIMOs has added more
fuel to this debate. The study found that patients whose access to prescription
drugs was most restricted incurred the highest overall health care costs, while
patients in an LIMO with an open formulary had the lowest costs. Ron Winslow,
Limiting Drugs A Doctor Orders May Cost More, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1996,
at Bl.
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20pharmaceutical markets and has challenged transactions that could lead to an-
ticompetitive eects.65 The agency traditionally investigates mergers of com-
petitors, or horizontal mergers, but in recent years it has shown increased in-
terest in vertical integration. Vertical integration in the supply and distribu-
tion of a product can be accomplished through a merger or through internal
expansion. These types of transactions, which often result in the increased ef-
ciency of an operation, ordinarily do not lead to antitrust problems.66 The
emergence of PBMs, however, has led the FTC to reexamine its analysis of ver-
tical integration.67 The agency's main concern is that some of the largest drug
companies have purchased or formed alliances with the leading PBMs, eec-
tively putting the majority of the nation's PBMs under the control of the drug
companies.
In light of this concern, the FTC challenged Eli Lilly's purchase of McKesson
Corp. and its PBM business, PCS LIealth Systems. Eli Lilly is ranked as one of
the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers in the country, and PCS is the largest
PBM.69 In its complaint, the FTC alleged that Lilly could discriminate against
other drug makers by foreclosing them from the PCS formulary.70 The agency
also alleged that the acquisition would facilitate collusion among Lilly
65 Mark D. Whitener, Competition and Antitrust Enforcement in the Chang-
ing Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301(1995) [hereinafter
Antitrust Enforcement].
66 Id
67Id at 302.
68 Id
69
701d at 303.
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21and other vertically integrated pharmaceutical companies.7' Other allegations
were that the acquisition would lead to increased prices, diminished product
quality, a reduction in the incentives of other pharmaceutical manufacturers to
innovate, and increased barriers to entry in the pharmaceutical market.72
Lilly and the FTC ultimately entered into a consent agreement that ad-
dressed the agency's concerns.73 The agreement requires Lilly to maintain an
open formulary that does not give undue preference to Lilly's products.74 All
drugs on the formulary must be selected by an independent Pharmacy and Ther-
apeutics Committee, which must use objective criteria to create and maintain
the formulary.75 The consent agreement also requires the placement of a re-
wall between Lilly and PCS, preventing the exchange of information concerning
bids, proposals, prices, discounts, and other information related to competitors'
products. 76
The FTC's investigation has led to suggestions that the Commission has de-
parted from its general view that vertical mergers often foster competition, and
that the FTC can be expected to scrutinize future vertical mergers in the phar-
maceutical industry.77 The Commission has been criticized for its inconsistent
analysis of vertical consolidations, which has led to uncertainty
~' Id
72 Id
731n re Eli Lilly and Co., Inc., Proposed Consent Agreement, FTC File No.
941-0102 (Nov. 28, 1994) (59 Fed. Reg. 60,815 (1994)).
~ Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 65, at 303.
~ Id
at 304.
'~ See Health Care Reform, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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22within the industry and to diminished interest in acquisitions of PBMs.78
Fewer acquisitions, however, may ease fears that the industry has become overly
consolidated.79
B. Less Research and Development
A decline in research and development may be another possible eect of
consolidation.
Since many drugs within a class are similar, the less expensive ones are typi-
cally selected to be on a formulary. With only a few drugs listed on a formulary,
companies have little incentive to invest in research and development of new
drugs that may oer only marginal improvements.80 Unless a manufacturer can
produce a breakthrough drug, it will dicult to get its product on a
formulary.8' Larger companies will be better able to bear the risk of research
than smaller companies, which could be driven out of business. Small companies
may be deterred from
entering the eld altogether. The regulatory and technological requirements
for entering the
pharmaceutical industry present additional barriers. Some analysts, how-
ever, predict that large drug makers may eventually rely on small biotechnology
companies, rather than their own
research and development departments, to do most breakthrough research,
and then market
78 See Enforcement Responses, supra note 45, at 316-17.
For the proposal that large consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry is
economically undesirable, see Christine Dodd, The Merck-Medco Merger: An
Isolated Incident Or a Catalyst for the Transformation of an Industry?, 63 U.
Cmi. L. REv. 1767 (1995), and Ruth Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Con-
spiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benet Management Industry:
A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 309
(1996).
80 See Health Care Reform, supra note 3, at 7-8.
81 Id
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23successful drugs under licensing agreements.
The FTC has also analyzed whether horizontal mergers and joint ventures
lead to less innovation, higher prices and reduced output. A horizontal merger
or acquisition involves the combination of rms at the same level of production
or distribution. The FTC analyzes such transactions under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act83 and the 1992 LIorizontal Merger Guidelines.84 In the context of
the pharmaceutical industry, anticompetitive eects may occur when a trans-
action eliminates a direct competitor in a therapeutic category, especially when
there are few alternatives and entry is dicult.85 Anticompetitive eects may
also occur when an acquisition eliminates competition between rms that were
potential entrants in a market, such as a rm that is awaiting FDA approval or
a rm that has undertaken signicant research and development eorts.86
In recent years, the FTC has challenged acquisitions that raised concerns
about innovation and competition. For example, in In re American LIome
Products Corp., the FTC obtained a consent settlement in the proposed acqui-
sition of American Cyanamid.87 The FTC determined that the merger would
eliminate direct competition between American Home Products and
82 Elyse Tanouye & George Anders, Drug Industry Takeovers Mean More
Cost-Cutting, Less Research Spending, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at Bl.
~ 15 U.S.C. x 18 (1988).
844 TRADE REG. REP. (CCLI) { 13,104 (1992).
85 See Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 65, at 305.
86 Id
87 FTC File No. C-3557 (consent settlement) (Feb. 14, 1995).
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24American Cyanamid and would increase the likelihood of coordinated interac-
tion. The FTC was concerned about anticompetitive eects in ve dierent
product markets, including research and development of a rotavirus vaccine.
There is no authorized vaccine for rotavirus, a disease that leads to the hos-
pitalization or death of thousands of children each year. American Cyanamid
and American LIome were two of three rms undertaking signicant research
and development of a vaccine. The consent agreement requires American LIome
Products to license American Cyanamid's rotavirus vaccine research, which will
ensure than an independent competitor will continue to work on the vaccine.89
C. Retailers Accuse Drug Companies of Price Discrimination
In a $351 million settlement reached last year, eleven major drug companies
agreed to stop charging retail pharmacies higher prices for medicine than the
companies charged managed care organizations.90 Some forty thousand retail
pharmacies had brought a lawsuit against virtually all of the leading manufac-
turers and wholesalers of brand name prescription drugs. One group of plaintis
alleged a price-xing conspiracy under the Sherman Act, ~' in which the defen-
dants agreed to eliminate price competition and to keep prices of prescription
brand name drugs articially high to retail pharmacies. Another group of plain-
tis, which opted out of the
~ See Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 65, at 305.
891d at 306.
901n re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, (Apr. 4, 1996,
N.D. Ill.),
1996 WL 167350.
91 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. x 1.
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25class, alleged Sherman Act conspiracy violations and price discrimination claims.92
Both groups of plaintis claimed that the defendants collusively created and
maintained a dual pricing system that raised or stabilized the prices that retail
pharmacies paid for prescription drugs. The plaintis alleged that the defen-
dants refused to make discounts and rebates available to the pharmacies, while
making them available to institutional or managed care buyers.
The defendants denied collusive behavior and argued that economic consid-
erations drove their denial of discounts to retail pharmacies. They argued that
retail pharmacies do not possess the same market power, or the same power over
the prescribing decision, compared to institutional and managed care buyers.
Managed care groups can restrict their doctors' prescriptions to the drugs listed
on a formulary, thereby ensuring that the drugs will be prescribed in volume.
Because managed care and institutional buyers have the power to aect market
share, they can negotiate discounts or rebates from pharmaceutical manufac-
turers. Manufacturers, enticed by gaining access to a large patient population,
and threatened with the prospect of exclusion from a formulary, oer discounts
and rebates in return for large-volume sales. The plaintis disputed the amount
of market power that managed care groups exert, and contended that they, too,
can aect market share.
Under the terms of the settlement, the drug companies must make the same
discounts available to any institution, whether managed care or pharmacy, pro-
vided the buyer can show it can shift market share. The settlement remains
controversial, however, since it is unclear whether
92 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. xx13(a), (d) and (f).
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26it will result in lower prices for consumers.93 Drug companies, instead of giving
discounts to everyone, may just give discounts to no one. Even if the drug
companies do give pharmacies discounts, the stores may not pass the savings
on to consumers.
IV. FRAUD AND ABUSE
A. Questionable Marketing Practices in the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try
1. Gifts to Physicians
For many years, it was a common practice for phannaceutical companies, as
well as device and medical equipment companies, to give gifts to physicians.94
These gifts ranged from the extravagant, such as all-expense paid cruises to the
Caribbean, to the mundane, such as pens and pads of paper embossed with a
company's name. Other promotional activities included making cash payments
to physicians for attending or speaking at conferences, or awarding physicians
money or prizes on the basis of the prescriptions they generated. With no clearly
drawn line to dierentiate innocuous gifts from unethical or illegal kickbacks,
such activities proliferated.
~ See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen & Elyse Tanouye, Bitter Pill: Drug Makers Set
to Pay $600
Million to Settle Lawsuit by Pharmacies; Retailers Object to Practice Of
Granting Discounts to
HMOs But Not Them, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996 at Al; Elyse Tanouye &
Ron Winslow,
Pharmaceuticals: Drug-Suit Settlement May Be Bitter Pill for Consumers,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,
1996, at B 1; Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value; Drug Pact May Be Worse
Than the Disease,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at Cl; Robert Langreth, Settlement Cleared in
Pharmacies' Suit Over
Price Fixing, But Debate Lingers, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1996, at B5.
See Mary-Margaret Chren & C. Seth Landefeld, Doctors, Drug Companies,
and Gffts, 262 JAMA 3448 (1989).
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27Giving and accepting gifts can have practical and ethical repercussions.95 Ac-
cepting a gift establishes a relationship between the physician and the drug
company that obliges a response from the physician.96 Moreover, the cost of
gifts is ultimately passed on to patients. Taxpayers bear the burden when the
cost of prescription drugs is subsidized by government programs. Serious ethical
issues arise when physicians alter their prescribing practices to the detriment of
their patients.
Some types of gifts are an outright attempt to buy inuence, while other gifts,
such as the provision of funds for educational seminars and conferences, serve a
socially benecial purpose. Through funding conferences and research projects,
drug companies have made signicant contributions to medical knowledge. Such
contributions, however, are motivated by nancial considerations, which can
lead companies and physicians to engage in self-interested practices that can
ultimately harm patients.
2. Ethical Guidelines Reassessed
In response to widespread criticism of excessive gift-giving practices, Amer-
ican Medical Association's (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs ul-
timately revised its code of ethics for the medical profession. On December 3,
1990, before the beginning of a congressional
~ Social scientists have described the norm of reciprocity as a fun-
damental principle that guides human interactions. Pharmaceutical companies
rely on this principle by giving gifts to physicians with the expectation that
those physicians will prescribe their pharmaceutical products in return. See
Teri Randall, Ethics of Receiving Gffts Considered, 265 JAMA 442 (1991).
96 Id.
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28hearing concerning promotional practices in the pharmaceutical industry,97 the
AMA Council issued guidelines addressing gifts to physicians from industry.98
The Council subsequently published a report that provided the reasoning behind
the guidelines and its interpretations of specic provisions.99 Two days after
the AMA issued its guidelines, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(PMA) adopted the guidelines as part of its code of pharmaceutical marketing
practices.
The AMA's guidelines attempted to address three ethical concerns. The
rst concern is that physicians' practices are inuenced by gift-giving.100 The
council acknowledged that promotional activities are intended to increase sales
and that these activities aect physician's behavior.10' Under such inuences,
physicians may prescribe drugs based on considerations that go beyond scientic
knowledge and patient needs.'02 The second concern is with the appearance of
impropriety, especially where gifts are of substantial value.'03 The third concern
is that the
97Advertising, Marketing and Promotional Practices of the Pharmaceutical
Industry:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st
Cong. (Dec. 1990). During the hearings, physicians and former pharmaceutical
executives revealed extravagant marketing practices, such as sending physicians
and their spouses on all-expense paid trips to exotic locations for educational
conferences.
98 Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs, American Medical Association,
Gfs to Physicians from Industry, 265 JAMA 501 (1991).
~ Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs, American Medical Association,
Guidelines on Gals to Physicians from Industry: An Update, 47 FOOD DRUG
L.J. 445 (1992).
'001d at 447.
101 Id
'02Id
103 Id at 449.
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29costs of gifts are ultimately passed on to the public.'04
The guidelines instruct physicians to avoid the acceptance of inappropriate
gifts. Acceptable gifts should primarily entail a benet to patients and should
not be of substantial value.'05 Cash payments should not be accepted, but text-
books, modest meals, and other gifts are appropriate if they serve a genuine
educational function. Gifts of minimal value, such as pens and notepads, are
permissible if they relate to the physician's work. A physician may not accept
a gift if there are strings attached. An example of such a situation would be
accepting a gift that is given in relation to a physician's prescribing practices.
Funds provided to subsidize the cost of continuing medical education con-
ferences are permissible as long as the funds are given to the sponsor of the
conference and not to the individual physician. Sponsors can use the subsidy to
reduce the registration fee of the conference, thus providing a more indirect ben-
et to physicians. The rationale behind this provision is that such conferences
contribute to the improvement of patient care and should thus be encouraged.
Companies should not, however, give money directly to a physician, since that
type of gift could improperly inuence the use of the company's products. The
guidelines advise physicians not to accept payment, whether direct or indirect,
for the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal or compensatory expenses
incurred for attending a conference or meeting.
Although it is unclear how eective the AMA's guidelines have been in curb-
ing unethical behavior, they have caused some drug companies and physicians
to reassess promotional activities that were once taken for granted. Shortly
after the guidelines were published, the drug company
'041d at 450.
1051d at 451.
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30Collagen cancelled a South Pacic cruise for principal physician users of the
company's Zyderm and Zyplast injectable collagen products.'06 Physicians were
invited to attend the cruise based on the quantity of injectable collagen they
had purchased during a promotional campaign and the percentage increase over
the amount they had purchased the previous year.'07
Collagen, which is not a member of either the AMA or PMA, was concerned
about perceived conicts between the trip and the guidelines on industry gifts to
physicians. In a letter to physicians, Collagen stated that although it believed
that physicians participating in this program would in no way be violating any
ethical guideline, they would be cancelling the trip because they did not want
to put their physician customers in a politically awkward s1tuat1on.'~'~ Even
though Collagen was not technically subject to the AMA or PMA guidelines,
physicians who went on the trip would be violating their own guidelines. Specil-
ically, they would violate the provision that physicians should not accept gifts
based on their prescribing practices and the provision that physicians should not
accept travel or lodging from industry. Furthermore, if the physicians received
federal reimbursement for collagen, they might be violating the Medicare and
Medicaid Antikickback Statute.
The possibility of violating the ethical guidelines as well as the antikickback
statute made the Collagen promotion a risky venture. Whether the guidelines,
alone, would have been a sucient deterrent is debatable. By themselves, the
guidelines seem to be weak deterrents to unethical conduct because violating
them does not lead to serious consequences. Combined with
106 F-D-C REP. (THE GRAY SHEET), June 17, 1991, at 4.
'07Id
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31a strong federal statute, however, the promotional schemes of the past are not as
blatant as they once were. While drug companies still use traditional methods
to market their products, vigilant enforcement eorts have caused the industry
to modify or cease some longstanding practices. The emergence of managed care
has also led the drug industry to develop new types of promotional activities.
Some of these activities, however, test the bounds of the law.
B. The Federal Antikickback Statute
The federal antikickback statute, which is commonly called the Medicare
and Medicaid Antikickback Statute, supplies federal prosecutors with a tool to
combat health care fraud. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the statute has been expanded to cover federal
health care programs other than just Medicare and Medicaid. The antikickback
statute has curtailed unlawful practices in the health care industry, but it has
also been criticized for its broad scope. The language of the statute arguably
encompasses lawful, as well as unlawful activities, leaving the health care in-
dustry with little guidance on how to structure its aairs. The safe harbor
regulations provide assurance that certain activities will be beyond the reach
of the anti-kickback statute, but these regulations have been criticized for be-
ing overly narrow. New regulations will be adopted and old ones modied as
industry practices continue to evolve in the context of managed care.
1. Development of the Antildckback Statute
The federal antikickback statute, which applies to health care programs
funded by the federal government, is the primary enforcement weapon to combat
fraud and abuse in the health
30
32care industry. The statute makes the knowing and willful oer, payment, solici-
tation, or receipt of any remuneration (directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly,
in cash or in kind) in return for or to induce a referral of goods or services
payable by the federal government a felony punishable by up to ve years in
prison and a ne of up to $25,000.109 The relevant portions of the Act provide
that:
(b)( 1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remunera-
tion (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind{
(A) in retum for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made
in whole or in part under a Federal healthcare program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering or arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing or ordering any good, facility, service or item for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal healthcare program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be ned not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than ve years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly willfully oers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate), directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind to any person to induce such person{
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or
in part under a Federal healthcare program, or (B) to purchase, lease, order
or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing or ordering any good, facility,
service or item for which payment may be made, in whole or in part under a
Federal healthcare program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be ned not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than ve years, or both.0
109 Social Security Act x 1 128B(b); 42 U.S.C. x 1320a-7b(b) (as modied by
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-191,
Tit. II x 204, 110 Stat. 1936, 1999 (1996)).
110 Id
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33Violators are subject to criminal penalties as well as exclusion from the federal
health care programs. The Department of Health and Human Service (EllIS).
through the Oce of the Inspector General (OIG), has the authority to inves-
tigate potential violations of the statute and to bring enforcement actions. The
OIG does not have the authority to impose civil money penalties, but it has
entered into monetary settlements with those under investigation for violating
the statute.
The development of the statute can be traced as follows. A provision pro-
scribing kickbacks was rst included in the Social Security Act in 1972.' Viola-
tions were then classied as misdemeanors, not felonies, as they are today, and
there was no requirement of intent. In 1977, Congress enacted the Medicare-
Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 to expand the scope of the
statute and to provide greater specicity. The amendment prohibited any remu-
neration, not just kickbacks or bribes, raised the violations from misdemeanors
to felonies, and listed two statutory exceptions for employees and certain dis-
count arrangements.112
In 1987, Congress passed the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program
Protection Act of 1987, which gave the OIG civil sanction authority for kick-
back violations.3 The Act also mandated that the OIG promulgate safe harbor
regulations specifying permissible practices under the antikickback law.
' Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329
(1972).
112 Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977).
'Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, P.L.
100-93, 101 Stat. 682 (1987).
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34Most recently, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (LIIPAA), which made several changes to the antikickback
statute.4 H[PAA expanded the reach of the statute beyond Medicare and Medi-
caid and other state health care programs. As of January 1, 1997, the antikick-
back statute will apply to all federal health care programs, dened as any plan
or program that provides health benets, whether directly, through insurance,
or otherwise, which is funded in whole or in part, by the United States Gov-
ernment with the exception of the federal employee health benets programs.5
HIPAA also created a new statutory exception for certain risk-sharing agree-
ments, and it requires HHS to provide advisory opinions determining whether
a transaction will be subject to the antikickback statute.
2. Statutory Exceptions and Safe Harbor Regulations
Because the language of the anti-kickback statute is broad, it prohibits many
commercial arrangements. The reach of the statute is limited, however, by statu-
tory exceptions and safe harbor regulations. The antikickback statute currently
includes the following exceptions, which describe acts that are immune from
prosecution: (1) discounts that are properly disclosed and reected in the costs
claimed or charges made by the provider, (2) payments by an employer to an
employee for bona de employment in the provision of covered items and ser-
vices, (3) amounts paid by providers to a group purchasing organization (GPO),
in which there is a written
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
~ Social Security Act x 1 128B(b); 42 U.S.C. x 1320a-7b(f) (as modied by
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-19 1,
Tit. II x 204, 110 Stat. 1936, 2000 (1996)).
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35agreement between the providers and the GPO specifying the fee and the GPO
discloses the amount of the administrative fee to providers purchasing from the
GPO, (4) waivers of comsurance amounts in connection with certain federally
qualied health care centers, (5) activities protected by the safe harbor regula-
tions, (6) certain risk sharing agreements.'16
The safe harbor regulations, which were promulgated pursuant to the Medi-
care and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, further narrow
the scope of the antikickback statute.7 In July, 1991, the OIG promulgated
the rst set of safe harbor regulations, which explicitly describe permissible
conduct.8 The OIG developed safe harbor regulations to limit the reach of the
statute somewhat by permitting certain non-abusive arrangements, while en-
couraging benecial and innocuous arrangements.9 Business practices that con-
form with the safe harbor regulations will not be treated as criminal oenses
under the antikickback statute and will not serve as a basis for program exclu-
sion. The preamble states, If a person participates in an arrangement that fully
complies with a given provision, he or she will be assured of not being prose-
cuted criminally or civilly... 120 Compliance with the safe harbor provisions is
voluntary. Activities that are not in compliance with the regulations are not
per se illegal and will not necessarily result in prosecution.
116 Social Security Act x 1 128B(b)(3); 42 U.S.C. x 1320a-7b(3) (as modied
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-
191, Tit. II x 216, 110 Stat. 1936, 2007 (1996)).
~ 42 C.F.R. 1001.952.
118 56 Fed. Reg. 35,932 (July 29, 1991).
~ Id at 35,952.
120 Id. at 35, 954.
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36The rst set of safe harbor regulations covered the following areas: (1) invest-
ment interests, (2) space rental, (3) equipment rental, (4) personal services and
management contracts. (5) sale of practice, (6) referral services, (7) warranties,
(8) discounts, (9) employees, (10) group purchasing organizations, and (11)
waiver of beneciary coinsurance and deductible amounts for inpatient hospital
services and certain federally qualied and federally funded health care facilities.
In November 1992, the OIG published, in interim nal form, three safe har-
bors related to managed care activities. The safe harbors cover: (1) incentives
oered to beneciaries, such as the waiver or reduction of coinsurance and de-
ductible amounts, (2) provider discounts to managed care plans, and (3) waivers
of inpatient coinsurance and deductible amounts by Medicare SELECT PPOs.'2'
After reviewing comments from the public, in January 1996, the OIG issued the
managed care safe harbor regulations in nal form.'22
The OIG is currently in the process of nalizing additional safe harbor pro-
visions, which would expand protection for investment interests in rural areas,
ambulatory surgical centers and group practices.'23 Furthermore, in accordance
with section 205 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, the OIG has solicited proposals and recommendations for developing new
and modifying existing safe harbor provisions.'24
121 ~ Fed. Reg. 52,723 (Nov. 5, 1992).
122 61 Fed. Reg. 2,122 (Jan. 25, 1996).
123 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (Sep. 21, 1993).
124 61 Fed. Reg. 69,060 (Dec. 31, 1996). The OIG will consider the
following factors for new or modied safe harbor provisions: access to health
care services, the quality of health care services, patient freedom of choice among
healthcare providers, competition among health care providers, the cost to the
federal health care programs, the potential overutilization of the health care
services, and the ability of health care facilities to provide services in medically
underserved
35
373. Current Developments
After the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 was
passed, the Clinton Administration recommended that three of the fraud and
abuse provisions be repealed.'25 First, the Administration would like to repeal
the managed care exception for risk-sharing agreements, since it believes that the
exception provides too much protection for possibly fraudulent arrangements.'26
Second, the denition ofknow or should know, which requires the government to
prove that an act was committed with deliberate ignorance or reckiess disregard
of the truth, may be repealed.'27 Third, they are seeking to repeal the OIG's
authority to issue advisory opinions.'28 The OIG itself is opposed to issuing ad-
visory opinions, as it believes that such opinions would impede law enforcement
eorts.'29 One concern is that approval of a particular transaction may be dif-
cult, since liability often turns on the fact-specic question of intent. Another
concern is that companies will obtain advisory opinions, misconstrue them, and
areas or to medically underserved populations. Id
'25 See Came Valiant & David E. Matyas, LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH-
CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE: NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAINTIES 387 (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAINTIES].
'27~d In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit developed a two-
part test for determining whether a defendant has violated the scienter require-
ment of the antikickback statute, which provides that a defendant must have
acted knowingly and willfully. In Hanlester, the court held that for a violation
to be found, the defendant must know of the statutory prohibitions against of-
fering or paying remuneration to induce prohibited behavior. The defendant
must also have formed a specic intent to break the law. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir.
1995).
128 NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAINTIES, supra note 125, at 387.
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38then use the opinion to shield their conduct from liability.'30
Companies would have to pay a fee to obtain an advisory opinion, but the
cost may be worth the certainty the opinion would provide.'3' It is unclear,
however, how much certainty or guidance the opinions will oer. The OIG,
through these opinions, can only interpret the broad statutory language. An
overly broad opinion, like the statute itseW will not provide useful guidance.
The advisory opinions would only be truly useful to the health care industry W
based on the OIG's review of the specic facts of each transaction, the opinion
provides protection against enforcement actions.'32
C. Investigations and Enforcement Activities
1. The Oce of the Inspector General
In 1976, Congress established the Oce of Inspector General (OIG) to iden-
tify and eliminate fraud, abuse, and waste in HHS programs.'33 The OIG in-
vestigates cases of fraud and abuse connected with LIHS programs, and refers
cases to the Department of Justice for civil or
See Eric Weissenstein, Update: White House After Fraud Reform Repeal,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 17, 1997, at 80.
See HHS IG Advisory Opinion Interim Final Rule Lays Out Payment Sys-
tem, Information Requirements for Requestors Under HIPAA , 9 HEALTH
NEWS DAiLY 1, Feb. 20,
1997.
132 See Carrie Valiant, Revising Anti-Kickback Law May Provide Best Guid-
ance, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 24, 1994, at 50.
'~' The Department of Health and Human Services (hITS), through the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), is responsible for administering
the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Medicare is a federal program, and Med-
icaid is a joint federal/state program. HCFA administers claims and payment
for Medicare through private insurance companies.
37
39cnminal prosection. The OIG also has the authority to exclude parties from the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, but they do not have authority to impose
civil money penalties for violations of the antikickback statute. Parties under
investigation have, however, voluntarily entered into monetary settlements with
the 01G.
As part of its ongoing investigation into prescription drug marketing prac-
tices, the OIG has found that pharmaceutical companies oer physicians money
and other items of value. The OIG has described four major categories of of-
fers used for promotional purposes: studies, speaking engagements, program
attendance, and gifts:'34
 Studies. Pharmaceutical companies ask physicians to participate
in studies of FDA-approved drugs. The companies may oer cash, medical
equipment, large grants, and trips for participation in a study.
 Speaking Engagements. Pharmaceutical companies pay a physi-
cian honoraria and travel expenses in exchange for speaking on various topics,
including the benets of the company's products.
 Program Attendance. Pharmaceutical companies oer payments
of cash, travel expenses, lodging, meals, entertainment, and recreational activi-
ties to physicians for attending promotional programs.
 Gifts. Pharmaceutical companies oer physicians gifts, such as
items useful in medical practice, meals, promotional gadgets, trips, and prizes.
~ Prescription Drug Marketing: Questionable Practices Within the Pharma-
ceutical Industry: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Op-
portunities, and Technology of the Comm. on Small Business, 103rd Cong. 68
(Oct. 1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of June Gibbs Brown, Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services).
38
40The OIG found that the prescribing practices of physicians are sometimes af-
fected by the promotional eorts of pharmaceutical companies and that the
companies are more likely to oer gifts and payments to physicians who are
frequent prescribers than to those who are infrequent prescribers. '
The Caremark case is one notable example of an OIG investigation. The
investigation, which involved a promotional scheme giving physicians nan-
cial incentives for prescribing growth hormone drugs, also led to Congressional
involvement.'36 Caremark, a national home health care company, had been pro-
moting human growth hormone drugs to treat short children. Treatment with
these synthetic hormones, which are harvested from cadavers, costs $20,000-
$30,000 per year.'37 Caremark was accused of giving kickbacks to physicians
to prescribe the drugs to children who were not clinically hormone decient,
but just shorter than average. The antikickback statute was implicated because
some of the drugs were reimbursed by Medicaid.
OIG's investigation revealed that Caremark and Genentech, the manufac-
turer of the growth hormone drug Protropin, paid Dr. David K Brown, a
pediatric endocrinologist, kickbacks to induce him to prescribe the drugs to his
juvenile patients. The kickbacks were paid in the guise of research grants, as
revenue generated from patient referrals, as consulting agreements, and
'Id.
136 at 40. Although the hearings were sparked by the growth hormone
controversy, the
focus of the hearing was broader. Rep. Ron Wyden, the chairman of the
subcommittee, stated
that his concern about drug marketing and promotion goes far beyond allega-
tions that a couple
of drug companies have mistreated short children. It seems to me that what
you have described is
a pattern [of] organized state-of-the-art marketing abuses that are exploiting
patients. Id at 12-
13.
'i Id at 2.
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41138
through the payment of overhead support such as oce expenses and the
salary of a nurse. In return for these payments, the physician, who was one of
the largest prescriber of Protropin in the country, generated over $4 million in
patient referral revenue for Caremark. ~
On August 4, 1994, a federal grand jury in Minneapolis returned a 51-count
indictment against Dr. Brown for receiving kickbacks from Caremark.'40 Dr.
Brown was ultimately found guilty of receiving kickbacks in exchange for pre-
scribing Protropin, but changes against the individual executives of Genentech
and Caremark were dismissed.'4'
As a result of the OIG's investigation, Caremark and Genentech agreed to
withdraw direct support for height screening programs. They also agreed to
stop providing direct research grants, nurses, and oce equipment to clinicians.
In June 1995, Caremark, Inc. pleaded guilty and paid $161 million in criminal
nes, civil restitution and damages for committing fraud in its human growth
hormone business. 142
2. Special Fraud Alerts
The OIG periodically issues Special Fraud Alerts that describe impermissible
conduct in the healthcare industry. The Special Fraud Alerts, which are widely
distributed throughout the
138 Id at 6.
"Id
Doctor Is Found Guilty Of Receiving Kickbacks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
1995.
142 United States v. Caremark, CCLI Medicare and Medicaid Guide, {
43,406, No. Cr. 4-
97-95 (D. Minn., June 16, 1995).
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42healthcare industry, provide notice that the OIG is aware of and plans to take
action against, specied abusive practices.'43 The alerts also serve as a tool
to encourage industry compliance by giving aected entities an opportunity to
examine their practices.' The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 requires the OIG to solicit proposals for new Special Fraud Alerts
that would provide additional guidance regarding unlawful practices.'45
In August, 1994, the OIG issued a Special Fraud Alert which described pre-
scription drug marketing schemes that would violate the anti-kickback statute.'46
The alert was released in response to questionable marketing practices that
go beyond traditional advertising and educational contacts. The alert notes
that physicians and other suppliers are increasingly being oered valuable, non-
medical benets in exchange for selecting specic prescription drug brands.'47
The alert describes the danger of these marketing schemes:
Traditionally, physicians and pharmacists have been trusted to provide treat-
ments and recommend products in the best interest of the patient. In an era
of aggressive drug marketing, however, patients may now be using prescription
drug items, unaware that their physician or pharmacist is being compensated
for promoting the selection of a specic product.... A marketing program that is
illegal under the anti-kickback statue may pose a danger to patients because the
oering or payment of remuneration may interfere with a physician's judgment
in determining
61 Fed. Reg. 69,061 (Dec. 31, 1996).
"Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No
104-191, Tit. llx210, 110 Stat. 1936, 2000(1996).
146 HHS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, Special Fraud Alert: Pre-
scription Drug Marketing Schemes (1994) [hereinafter Special Fraud Alert].
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43the most appropriate treatment for a patient.'48
Since the prescription drugs supplied under one of these aggressive mar-
keting programs are often reimbursed by Medicaid, those participating in such
programs may be prosecuted for violating the antikickback statute.
The OIG identied three types of cases that violate the antikickback statute.
'~ One type of case involved a product conversion program, whereby a drug
company oered cash to a pharmacy each time a drug prescription was changed
to that drug company's product. The OIG had investigated Bayer AG's Miles
Inc. for a program that paid pharmacists to counsel patients about its heart
drug, Adalat CC.
Another case concerned a frequent ier program in which a drug company
gave airline frequent ier mileage to physicians each time they completed a
questionnaire for a new patient placed on the drug company's product. In 1993,
Ayerst Laboratories, Inc. had a promotion scheme called the Patient Prole Pro-
gram, under which it provided participating physicians with a pharmaceutical
product it manufactured, preprinted prescription pads, and a questionnaire. Ay-
erst then awarded physicians frequent yer points each time the physician com-
pleted a brief questionnaire for new patients prescribed the company's product.
Ayerst denied wrongdoing, but agreed to pay the federal government $830,000
to settle civil and administrative claims.'50
"i The OIG did not name specic companies in the Special Fraud Alert, in
part because the activities are typical in the industry. Elyse Tanouye, Drug
Marketers May Use Illegal Tactics to Sell, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1994, at Bl.
150Id
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44The nal case identied by the Special Fraud Alert involved a research pro-
gram in which physicians received remuneration for a drug manufacturer under
the guise of payments for conducting research. Homann-LaRoche's grant-in-
aid program oered money to physicians who prescribed their products and
performed minimal record keeping tasks, which the company characterized as
studies. Many physicians were selected based on their ability to recommend the
company's products or because they were in a position to include the company's
drugs on a hospital formulary. The participating physicians were paid substan-
tial amounts for making brief notes, sometimes one word, about the treatment
outcome of a patient taking the company's product. In a number of cases, the
physicians never completed the research and still received the full grant pay-
ment. Homan-LaRoche eventually agreed to pay $450,000 to settle civil and
administrative claims.'5'
The Special Fraud Alert noted that even if these schemes involve a legiti-
mate purpose, if one purpose of a scheme is to induce the provision of a drug
reimbursable by Medicaid, the antikickback statute is implicated.'52 The Special
Fraud Alert warns that OIG investigation may be warranted when a prize, gift,
or cash payment is oered to drug suppliers153 in exchange for
' Honann-LaRoche To Pay HHS $450, 000 Settlement, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 1994, at Cl.
152 Special Fraud Alert, supra note 146. The one purpose test was articulated
in United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
988 (1985). In Greber, the owner of a cardlo-monitor company characterized
payments made to physicians as interpretation fees. The Third Circuit held
that the antikickback statute is violated if one intended purpose of payment is
to induce physicians to use defendant's services, even if the payments were also
made for professional services. Thus, violations of the statute may be found
when at least one purpose is to induce prohibited behavior.
A supplier includes physicians, pharmacies, mail order prescription drug
companies, and managed care organizations.
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45prescribing or providing pharmaceutical products. The scheme is particularly
suspect when the payments are based on the volume of business generated for
the drug company. Payments made to pharmacists for marketing tasks are
also suspect, as are payments made to physicians for studies of prescription
products when the studies are of questionable scientic value and require little
or no actual scientic pursuit. 's
3. The Managed Care Context
Members of the heath care industry have expressed concern that some man-
aged care practices may be construed as violations of the antikickback statute.
For example, formulary rebates to PBMs, HMOs, pharmacies, and other man-
aged care entities could give rise to an OIG investigation and enforcement action.
Specically, payments made to PBMs to inuence prescribing practices through
formularies could constitute remuneration in return for recommending or ar-
ranging the purchase of a product.' In a sense, PBMs are analogous to group
purchasing organizations (GPOs) since they both operate as middle men who
get rebates but are not the ultimate product purchasers.'56 Payments to a GPO,
however, can be protected under the GPO safe harbor regulation. There are
currently no safe harbors to protect PBMs.
Disease Management Programs (DMIPs) could become another target of an
antikickback
Special Fraud Alert, supra note 146.
'55HH5 IG Auditing Pharmaceutical Pricing, Impact of PBMs on Patient
Quality of Care, F-D-C REP. (THE PINK SHEET), June 3, 1996, at 7-8.
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46investigation.'57 Pharmaceutical companies and managed care organization have
formed DMP arrangements, which are programs to manage the health care of
patients through medication regimens. For a xed price, drug companies provide
their products to managed care organizations, which then list the drugs on a
DMP formulary. Antikickback concerns arise since payments are, in eect, being
made to encourage the increased use of drugs.
Some commentators have argued that the antikickback statute is becoming
increasingly irrelevant under managed care.'58 The antikickback statute was
passed under the fee-for-service system, which provided incentives to physicians
to increase the volume of services provided. The statute was designed to deter
such behavior so that costs to the Medicare and Medicaid programs would be
reduced. Now, managed care systems have put in place their own incentives,
such as capitation, to limit services. Patients pay a at fee regardless of services
provided, so additional services do not generate additional revenue. With these
self-imposed incentives to keep costs down, the need for government-imposed
incentives has decreased.
V. CONCLUSION
Managed care has revolutionized the pharmaceutical industry, as well as the
entire health care system. Managed care organizations achieve cost-containment
objectives by controlling, to various degrees, how physicians practice medicine.
This has led the drug companies to redesign their marketing programs with an
eye toward the institutional or managed care customer. As the
'~ See Disease Management Programs, supra note 47. The author suggests
that DMPs are benecial arrangements that should be given safe harbor pro-
tection.
158 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolv-
ing Health Care Marketplace: Lfe in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 Am. J.L. &
Med. 205 (1996).
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47pharmaceutical industry explores dierent types of managed care alliances, it
must be prepared to face various legal challenges. Drug companies have success-
fully taken advantage of protable arrangements in the new health care market.
As they aggressively pursue prots, however, they must be careful not to let
their zeal lead to illegal or unethical practices.
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